Analyzing the Role of the Powell Doctrine in U.S. Foreign Policy

The Powell Factor: Analyzing the Role of the Powell Doctrine in U.S. Foreign Policy

by Josh Dormont
Gaines Junction: Undergraduate Journal of History
Spring 2005

JOSH DORMONT is a graduating senior at Cornell University in the College of Arts and Sciences. He is a History major with concentrations in European Studies and International Relations. He is the President of the Cornell Chapter of Americans for Informed Democracy, and a researcher with the Nathan Hale Foreign Policy Society. The paper was written under the supervision of Professor Walter LaFeber

“This is our fourth rendezvous with destiny: to lead the world at a time of immense opportunity – an opportunity never seen in the world before. As Lincoln said in 1862, America could not escape history. In 1992, we must not let history escape us.” – Colin Powell, December 19921

1. Introduction As modernized “swift boats” patrol the Euphrates, haunting images and memories of Vietnam have begun to creep back into the American conscience.2Once again, the use of American military power has come under the spotlight. Although largely replaced by September 11 as the cornerstone for foreign policy decisions in the current administration, the influence of Vietnam has had an important effect on the development of U.S. policy. Secretary of State Colin Powell, one of the few senior officials to have experienced the Vietnam War firsthand, tried to change what he saw as the failure of a government to fulfill its promises and duty to its country and the world. Powell's influence rose with the successes of Panama and the first Gulf War and ebbed with the post-Cold War security needs such as humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. Through a natural progression of developments since Vietnam, the administration has once again encountered the problem of spreading liberty at minimal cost to American citizens. The rise and fall of the Powell Doctrine tells not only the story of one man, but also the story of a generation, marred by Vietnam, rejuvenated with the fall of the Soviet Union, and once again petrified with the fall of the Twin Towers.

Along with Vietnam, one of Powell's main influences was his boss at the Pentagon in the 1980s, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger also saw the need to reform U.S. strategy at a critical juncture in U.S.-Soviet relations. Still recovering from Vietnam in 1984, Weinberger attempted to bring statist realism and a measure of prudence to U.S. foreign policy, while at the same time cautioning the Soviet Union against taking direct action against the United States.

His poignant words became policy until the end of the Cold War, when new opportunities and questions for U.S. foreign policy arose. Shortly after the collapse of the Berlin wall, Powell recognized that the end of the Cold War required a new way of thinking and a new strategy. He proffered a doctrine of his own, a mix of neutral, realist, and ideological insight. Promoting the use of diplomatic and economic tools before resorting to war, he was one of the last believers in containment and deterrence. He also stressed the importance of Washington 's role in global leadership.3If the course was war, he promoted the use of decisive and overwhelming force to carry out specific political objectives tied to a definitive exit strategy.

The invasion of Panama in 1989 represented the first application of the resurrected army and strategy since the days of Vietnam. The Powell Doctrine, successful in Panama and the first Gulf war, unwittingly revived the mentality that military solutions, so long as guided by clear political objectives and an exit strategy, were a viable alternative to diplomacy. Unfortunately, no President has since found a “Panama” of his own.

The first Gulf War was in a way a representation of the Powell spice added to a new recipe for the exertion of U.S. unilateral hegemony. The first Bush took the mandate of the UN to pursue a limited goal, managed not to infringe on the sovereignty of Iraq, pursued a decisive and overwhelming military campaign against Saddam's forces, and was able to exit before submitting U.S. troops to a prolonged and costly tour of duty.

As a clear example of the Powell Doctrine in action, Powell believed it was best not to invade Iraq and to pursue sanctions instead as a deterrent. Although Bush and Scowcroft never intended to go onto Baghdad, Powell's advice helped substantiate their views. It was an important demonstration of Powell's “exit strategy,” a key element missing in Operation Iraqi Freedom ten years later.

The Clinton administration brought a transforming variable to American foreign policy – humanitarian intervention – that tested the limits and responsibilities of U.S. power. During the 2000 campaign, after years of an unstable foreign policy, George W. Bush promised to reform America 's “antiquated” defense strategy and army.4Bush's appointment of Powell as Secretary of State seemed to confirm, at least to the international community, that the United States would pursue a return to the Powell Doctrine. Early indicators in Iraq, China, and even North Korea signaled to the contrary, but it was September 11 that shifted Bush's vision permanently.

The “revelation” of 9/11, as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called it, led the President to the conclusion that new forces in the world were acting against the security of the United States.5Bush charged ahead into battle, redefining new threats and agendas. In the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, he outlined a plan to bring democracy and “human freedom” to the world by conquering terrorist networks and rogue states.6Although controversial, and in many cases quite vague, the NSS of 2002 was a deliberate work of policy, meant to provide a rationale for the pursuit of Bush's new agenda – what his critics have called the pursuit of a new “empire.”7

After September 11, 2001, Bush set aside his anti-Clinton rhetoric and embraced a neo-Wilsonian strategy of fighting a new “-ism” that was mostly incompatible with the pragmatism of the Powell Doctrine. It was with one important difference: instead of collective security, Bush embraced Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's view of American leadership as a unipolar hegemon. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the growth of vast terrorist networks required important changes for U.S. strategy. Declaring a “war” against terrorism had deep implications of its own. As British historian Michael Howard wrote, “The ‘w' word has been used and now cannot be withdrawn, and its use has brought inevitable and irresistible pressure to use military force as soon, and as decisively, as possible.”8For such “stateless” wars, the Powell Doctrine provides little guidance beyond the use of fast and decisive force.

The differences of the Powell-Weinberger doctrines and the NSS 2002 seem to form a natural progression, considering their differing strategic environments. The conflicts that gave rise to the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines found no mention in the terrorist-based NSS 2002. Absent are Weinberger's “vital interest” or Powell's “political objectives,” and in turn, application of the NSS was easier, though not necessarily more successful. There was no mention of using force as a last resort or along side with any other form of power. Instead, it describes the use of power for building failing states to prevent the spread of terrorism or for the prevention of or retaliation from a terrorist attack.9The Powell and Weinberger doctrines presumed that public support is necessary, but intolerant of casualties and ambiguity of purpose. The NSS, on the other hand, presumes the “war on terrorism” to be necessary, leading to expected support from the public and international community. In essence, the NSS is a reflection of Bush's stronger unilateral and internationalist tendencies. Rather than a deviation from past strategies, it is a compilation of a stronger ideology with a strong sense of purpose.

Many of the problems, and their potential solutions, have not changed. While Rumsfeld's transformation of the military is inclined toward a more mobile force, less dependant on forward-deployed bases, the new strategy still prefers operations that are swift, decisive, and geared toward accomplishing specific political objectives. The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that these elements alone are not enough for the important task of state building.

2. Origins With the blessings of the President and National Security Council (NSC), Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger took the podium on November 28, 1984 at the National Press Club and outlined six “tests” to help guide American foreign policy. The speech, feeding off popular angst from Vietnam, was an important policy maneuver. As both a caution to the administration and a message to America's adversaries, the speech reflected public resentment from Vietnam while actively pursuing the policy of deterrence with the Soviet Union. It was a carefully crafted brief, ambiguous enough to leave both friends and foes in suspense as to what would incite the wrath of the American military.

Wilsonianism had provided an ideological and moral foundation for exerting U.S. influence across the globe at minimum cost.10When Vietnam turned sour and Nixon began the process of “Vietnamization,” the administration toned down the Wilsonian rhetoric and instead turned to an emphasis on the great power struggles. This had a dual purpose. Primarily, it assuaged the fears of the U.S. public that unless there was real danger ahead, the United States would not leap into another quagmire – the exact ideas articulated ten years later by Weinberger – and secondly, it played well to calm Soviet and Chinese fears of increased U.S. engagement overseas.11

In one of the shortest ‘doctrines' for foreign policy, Weinberger cautioned to only commit forces when deemed vital to the national interest or that of allies. He went on to say, before commitment, the government must have the support of the American people and elected representatives, and that the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort. He noted, if committed, the President must do so wholeheartedly with a clear intention of winning. In addition, the army needed clearly defined political and military objectives with appropriate strategies to achieve them. Finally, the relationship between objectives and forces must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.12It was fundamentally a realist doctrine, focusing on the instruments of national power, national interests, and threats to those interests.13

His forthrightness came under fire by civilians and military planners alike. One editorialist incorrectly theorized that Weinberger's shunning of anything but popular, winnable wars would give the Soviet Union a “free ticket” in the “messier” regions of the Middle East and Central Asia.14Weinberger knew the U.S. was not prepared to go to war with the Soviets in Afghanistan, and so sought to define the limits of what his adversary could and could not do. As Weinberger himself wrote, “Deterrence requires us to determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering aggression, even in a crisis – not to determine what would deter us.”15

Rhetorical exercises aside, Weinberger's speech reflected a growing sense throughout the United States that its foreign policy needed an overhaul. While Weinberger himself had not fought in Vietnam, his deputy, Colin Powell, returned from Vietnam with scars, medals, and a seething conscience to match. “‘War should be the politics of last resort,' Powell declared after his second Vietnam tour. ‘And when we go to war, we should have a purpose that our people understand and support; we should mobilize the country's resources to fulfill that mission, and then go in to win.'”16

As the first bricks of the Berlin Wall began to crumble, the “free world” reveled at the collapse of the Soviet Union. “No communist hordes threaten Western Europe today,” wrote Powell in 1992, “So our new strategy emphasizes being able to deal with individual crises without their escalating to global or thermo-nuclear war.”17 With the foundations for change laid and a new phase of history in the works, Powell sought to mend the mistakes of the past with a new strategy for action.

3. The Powell Doctrine Some critics have called Colin Powell's 1992 essay a “recipe for inaction.”18To the uninitiated, Powell's words of caution did limit the prospect of U.S. military intervention. However, Powell's doctrine led the U.S. to its first major victories since Vietnam. Although at first wary of the tests Weinberger laid out in 1984 as being too explicit and open about strategy, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell began to adopt and transform Weinberger's original assertions into his own set of beliefs.19

Unlike Weinberger's realist proclamations, Powell's assertions included an eclectic mix of neutral, realistic, and idealistic language.20Using many of Weinberger's ideas, Powell outlined his new view of American leadership in 1992. He believed in the use of economic, political, and diplomatic means to control conflict; to buttress those elements, he knew the presence of a strong military was necessary.21Powell did not shun the use of force, but instead insisted it be used after all other viable options were given a chance.22His belief in the adherence to an established “exit strategy” helped guide his prescriptions for action when necessary.

The 1989 invasion of Panama was the first successful operation after Vietnam and the last operation in which the military overtly directed political reconstruction before the invasion of Afghanistan. As a first response to the growing crisis in Panama, the administration attempted sanctions. Although fitting the mold of the Powell Doctrine (attempting the use of non-military means), they failed to achieve the desired effect of reversing or ending the crisis.23The ensuing military intervention was a by-the-book example of the Powell Doctrine in action: a rapid, decisive application of overwhelming force that removed a tyrant from power and brought democracy to an oppressed people with few casualties.24It was in Panama that the U.S. military, resurrected from the ashes of Vietnam, first revealed itself. Comprised mostly of light Army and Marines operating with a bold and offensive mission, Operation Just Cause set the mold the second Bush would attempt to follow.

As evidenced in Panama, Powell understood that war involved risks, and that some risks were worth taking. By 1990, the sting of Vietnam had worn off to a degree, and America's appetite for war was increasing with a rising sense of purpose and leadership.25Powell adapted well to the end of the Cold War, incorporating a measured sense of caution with a strong determination for mission and duty.26Later that year, with operations looming on the horizon against Saddam, he believed sanctions and deterrence would ensure a safe exit strategy for the military. As Powell commented in 1992, “Would it have been worth the inevitable follow-up: major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad? Fortunately for America , reasonable people at the time thought not.”27

With the cold war over, it was easier for the United States to wage war in a manner befitting Powell's philosophy.28Powell's plan called for more than just avoidance of another gruesome quagmire. It was a demonstration of U.S. leadership, supported by its allies, in the pursuit of specific political and strategic goals with a dominating and decisive force. Powell further linked political and foreign policy goals to a key American interest: oil.29

The Gulf War was fought for much more limited objectives and with more limited means than Operation Just Cause, “but we did use overwhelming force quickly and decisively,” noted Powell.30“Decisive” was not nearly as provocative an idea as “overwhelming” was to the media, and so historians, politicians, and the public confused Powell's original statement with its application in the Gulf. A clearer explanation for his strategy came the morning of January 23, 1992, when Powell told reporters, “Our strategy for going after this army is very, very simple. First we are going to cut it off, then we are going to kill it.”31

Changes were on the horizon when President Bush decided to send more than 25,000 troops into Somalia in the Fall of 1992. To many, it came as a complete surprise. According to several participants, the option of U.S. military deployment was not even on the agenda of the November 21 NSC meeting, and the basic position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President prior to November was that any engagement in Somalia would be a recipe for disaster, a second Vietnam in the making.32Somalia was a clear danger and risk for U.S. troops with no clear political lines to stand by. Why then, did President Bush and Powell together violate the Powell Doctrine?

Western's answer to this puzzle is that U.S. intervention in Somalia was the result of politicking among competing foreign policy elites, and the cumulative pressure on the administration to act in both Somalia and Bosnia.33Although neither Bosnia nor Somalia constituted vital national interests by themselves, the public began to support a limited policy to contain the conflict from spreading to areas of geo-strategic interest to the United States.34Finally, at the time of the Republican convention in 1992, Bush grew concerned about the growing public pressure to take action in Somalia, and in turn pressed forward with his own plans for war.

Madeleine Albright once asked Colin Powell during a meeting about Bosnia, “What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it.” Powell responded in his memoirs, “I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board.”35Somalia represented the turning point for U.S. military intervention; with it began the slow descent into half-hearted state building exercises undertaken during the Clinton administration.

4. Interregnum The introduction of humanitarian intervention as a key foreign policy issue transformed the missions and objectives of the U.S. military. While Powell's goal of halting crises before they erupt into larger-scale conflicts still played an important role as a “use-of-force” determinant, the lines of vital interest and national security, hallmarks of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, blurred.

“I'm making a decision that will cost young men their lives,” said President Bush the First after praying silently for guidance on overthrowing the Panama government.36Powell was relatively pleased with the way the first Bush had handled his foreign policy. “Mr. President,” Powell said, “you have sent us in harm's way when you had to, but never lightly, never hesitantly, never with our hands tied, never without giving us what we needed to do the job.”37His feelings could not have been more different with respect to the early years of the Clinton administration.

Powell's frustration sitting through the prolonged and undisciplined meetings of the Joint Chiefs before he left office was evident, and he repeatedly separated himself from the administration he believed to be heading in the wrong direction.38“My constant, unwelcome message at all the meetings on Bosnia,” wrote Powell in his memoirs, “was that simply that we should not commit military forces until we had a clear political objective.” Luckily for Powell, he only sat as chief for the first eight months of Clinton's administration. Unluckily for Powell, Clinton and his advisors began to steer foreign policy further away from the tenets of the Powell Doctrine.

During the 2000 campaign, Bush's foreign policy advisor, Condoleezza Rice, was quick to criticize Clinton's actions in Kosovo. “The Kosovo war was conducted incompetently,” wrote Rice, “in part because the administration's political goals kept shifting and in part because it was not, at the start, committed to the decisive use of military force.”39Almost word for word, and without so much as a nod in his direction, Rice endorsed the fundamental principles of the Powell Doctrine. Kosovo was one of many incidents where the “means and mission were not matched.”40Humanitarian intervention clouded the vision of national and vital interest. It subordinated the criterion of vital national interests to that of universal human rights.41Had Clinton stuck to “vital interests” and “national security” to limit military power, the very foundation of humanitarian intervention would have collapsed.42

Clinton 's challenges in office – engaging in “democratic expansion” through Wilsonian means without igniting domestic criticism – were not unique to his administration. Bush came into office in 2000 foreswearing liberal philosophies and pledging to put more guns behind his words. With Rice and Powell at his side, Bush had all but made a commitment to connect with his conservative roots.

5. “Superpowers don't do windows” When George W. Bush came into office, he promised he would put an end to the “open ended deployments and unclear military missions” of the Clinton administration.43“I don't think we can be all the things to everyone in the world. I think we have to be very careful where we commit our troops,” he said.44Promising to increase the defense budget, transform the military, and forgo “operations other than war,”45Bush attempted to avoid the long-standing criticisms of his predecessor's foreign policy and insure U.S. dominance in global affairs for the coming years. In unusually eloquent language, Bush declared, “Sending our military on vague, aimless and endless deployments is the swift solvent of morale.”46

Bush inherited a long-standing tradition of American internationalism and unilateralism. The problem was not that the President departed from the long tradition of liberal internationalism, it was that he continued some of its most dangerous features. However much Republicans and Democrats would eschew the notion, Bush took into office many of the same principles, ideals, and policies set before him by President Clinton. Despite National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's hinting at a removal of U.S. forces from the Balkans, the President reassured his NATO allies that his troops would remain. Furthermore, Powell mentioned in a speech in March 2001 that he would “pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off” with respect to North Korea. When the opportunity arose to show America's mettle in the spy plane incident with China, Bush showed early signs of a Clintonian conciliatory response.47

Despite Powell's frequent confrontations with Cheney, Rumsfeld, and others within the government over U.S. policy, one thing they all agreed on was that it was critical to define their international mission in terms of securing the national interest and spreading liberty.48

On September 10, 2001, the air at the Pentagon was filled with hope and ambition. Secretary Rumsfeld went on a FOX news show to talk about missile defense, the defense budget, and base changes.49In an interview with MSNBC on the same day, he commented on Powell's role in the cabinet, saying, “He is deeply engaged in helping to fashion the foreign policy.”50There was even talk of ways of saving money at the Pentagon.51Most importantly, whatever notions of security, safety, and peace Americans had on September 10 vanished with the lives of thousands of innocents the next morning.

Bush was baffled by the idea that countries could produce the ideology and goal of killing Americans in terrorist attacks. After September 11, the country looked to its Commander-in-Chief for direction and leadership. Throughout the year, Bush made several speeches that revealed his emotions and goals, but kept off the burning subject of Iraq. Finally, in the 2002 State of the Union, Bush gave the reporters what they were looking for: labeling Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as an “axis of evil.” It was short of the declaration of war Cheney and others were looking for, but it was farther than any step he had publicly taken before. By mixing the World War I spirit, including a Wilsonian model of expansion, with a new generation of “evil,” Bush's speechwriter Michael Gerson creatively articulated the President's emotions following September 11.52Many Europeans were skeptical of the President's new “last-minute Wilsonianism” because of his earlier reluctance to support humanitarian intervention,53but Bush had larger and greater plans for U.S. foreign policy.

Two new features emerged from Bush's speech: a return to a proactive foreign policy favoring state building, and a preemptive military strategy. While not by any means a new concept, for many, the most startling revelation of the 2002 NSS was the concept of preemption – a strategic doctrine promoted by Powell's rival of 1984, George Shultz.54September 11, however, provided a new meaning and purpose for preemption. Preemption meant not only military intervention, but also intelligence “assumptions” that were short of fact, but were best “guess” estimates to prevent another disaster.55As Rumsfeld said in 2001, “You can't defend at every place at every time against every technique, and you have to take it to them, and that means you have to preempt them.”56

Powell disappointed many of the critics of the NSS who saw him as a last bastion of hope in the administration. “U.S. strategy is widely accused of being unilateralist by design,” wrote Powell in 2004. “It isn't. It is often accused of being imbalanced in favor of military methods. It isn't. It is frequently described as being obsessed with terrorism and hence biased toward preemptive war on a global scale. It most certainly is not.”57Bush's critics, however, continued to speak out loudly and often against the new NSS. “[The President] emphasized not the value of building an antiterror coalition, but rather his unilateral intention to maintain U.S. military strength beyond challenge,” responded Madeleine Albright.58The true test came in the implementation of the new strategy, namely in Iraq.

6. The Axis of Evil Bush may have had it in his mind to finish where his father had left off in Iraq, but the intellectual force behind the ousting of Saddam was deputy secretary of defense, Paul Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz felt that in addition to the dangers of WMD proliferation, democracy was a better alternative to the fall of a dictatorship. Powell, however, thought the idea was ludicrous, calling the plans at one point “lunacy.”59Powell's concerns never dissuaded the President from war.

“Regime Change” was the on the agenda since 1998, when Congress authorized up to $97 million in military assistance to the Iraqi opposition. The plans went on the backburners, waiting for the right time and leadership for implementation. Just as Vietnam was a learning experience for Powell, September 11 was an important learning experience for Rumsfeld, the CIA, and the President. All wanted to avoid the mistakes of the past, but all had different approaches for the future. Vietnam taught Powell to be wary of political leaders making military decisions, and 9/11 taught the administration that they could not “wait for the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud,”60an underlying premise for preemption. The planning for regime change in Iraq centered around three key concerns: the use of WMD, winning quickly, and transitioning power to the Iraqis quickly and legitimately. A brief look at these objectives leaves open the possibility for a Powell-style military campaign; that, however, was not what the administration had in mind.

Advocates of the “new American way of war,” Rumsfeld's planned transformation of the military, did not totally eschew the Powell Doctrine; they oversimplified it. Turning war into a targeting drill, they saw a ‘decisive' campaign, one in which the enemy's will to fight eroded because of the “shock and awe” value of the military operations.61In turn, the U.S. developed a method of warfare that produces stunning military victories but does not necessarily accomplish the political goals for which the war was fought.

Rumsfeld's transformation of the military was not suited for the task of nation building. Iraq would “suck the oxygen out of just about everything else the United States was doing,” Powell warned Bush in a private meeting in 2002.62Powell was sure they would succeed militarily, but worried about the “day-after” implications. He knew that with the state of the U.S. military and the requirements of war, unilateralism was not an option. The compromise for Powell's exit strategy and Rumsfeld's transformation lay in an international coalition, able to bear the enormous costs and responsibilities of nation building in Iraq and allowing a shorter deployment for U.S. troops.63Ten days later, before Bush went before the UN, Cheney made a case for preemption in Iraq to the media; it was a direct affront to Powell's efforts for multilateralism.

Powell grew increasingly frustrated with the administration during the planning of the Iraq war, mainly because they would not listen to the State department's suggestions.64“We don't just want to replace one bad guy with another bad guy,” cautioned Powell during an early National Security Council (NSC) session on Iraq.65His complaints resounded an eerily similarity to those from the Clinton NSC. As his deputy Richard Armitage joked, Powell was often in the White House's “Ice Box,” removed from mainstream discussions, but occasionally brought in for advice.66Powell was not explicitly opposed to the war; he was much less of a dove than many believed him to be, but the war planning, seemingly led by Rumsfeld and Cheney, worried him.

Just as many officers from Vietnam chastised the Johnson administration for being “undemocratic” in its decision-making,67Powell saw the same problems rising again with Iraq. Much of the internal debate centered around Powell's insistence on going to the UN Security Council to sanction the war – a debate he eventually won. He was also successful in getting the President to reach for support from the nation. Although White House lawyers thought the President could declare war without a mandate from Congress, Bush wanted the full support of the American people, their representatives, and the international community;68it was a strong reflection of the views of both Weinberger and Powell.

Powell, the lone cabinet member with combat experience, represented an older generation of military thought, still tainted by Vietnam and more concerned with objectives than the fervor of fighting terrorism and expanding liberty. Fortunately for Bush, he was also one of the most successful diplomats in the President's arsenal, able to bring Pakistani leader Musharraf to the U.S.'s side for operations in Afghanistan.69His second major speech at the UN, urging a second resolution on Iraq, also earned the title of “the Powell buy-in,” a tribute to his devotion, honor, and respectability.70

Bush understood that to fight a successful war with his new military, help from the international community was necessary, and in Afghanistan, both he and Powell proved to be extraordinarily effective diplomats. Patience and sympathy for the U.S. began to ebb when Washington turned its sights on Iraq.

When Powell went to present the U.S. case on Iraq to the UN Security Council, he had a dual purpose to fulfill. First, he was giving the international community one last chance to join Washington in a fight the administration had already concluded it must undertake. Second, as the announcement of war did not come from the hawkish members of Bush's administration, but from the senior official widely seen as this administration's voice of reason, moderation, and prudence, Bush hoped he could garner greater support.71

As the New Year approached, Bush feared the UN talks would hurt America's chance of a strong coalition. Furthermore, the military planners, especially within the CIA, became edgy, setting a final date for war in March.72The generals were skittish about giving the President an exact period for the war, and were even more reluctant to give casualty figures, primarily because of their experience watching the body counts from Vietnam.73Their plan was lethal, but a critical element was avoiding high enemy and civilian casualties. Every target with over 30 potential civilian casualties went before the President for approval.74

Historian Bernard Lewis and Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi were able to convince the administration that nation building in Iraq would be an easy process, much less costly than the previous experience in the Balkans.75They dismissed Powell's arguments that a U.S. invasion would lead to further anti-American sentiment, and that the army would face a fierce insurgency in the cities. Anti-Americanism, Lewis argued, was a product of envy and resentment at America's success.76“Were we to pick up where we left off a decade ago and head to Baghdad ,” Ajami wrote, “the tormented people of Iraq would be sure to erupt in joy.”77Their words were taken as gospel without any supporting intelligence, and the plans for war were finally ready.

Bush prepared the nation for a campaign of “Shock and Awe” in Iraq, promising a swift victory with minimal U.S. casualties. The war plans represented a real-world exercise of Rumsfeld's planned transformation of the military united with elements of the Powell discipline, mainly the use of light and lethal forces working to gain decisive and quick victories with minimal casualties to sustain support at home. Although different from Powell's belief in building support before action, the military planners worked to create strategies that sustained support at home.

While not specifically erroneous as a military strategy, “Shock and Awe” left out one of the most critical components of the Powell Doctrine: making military means meet political ends. As Kagan commented, “The true center of gravity in a war of regime change lies not in the destruction of the old system, but in the creation of the new one.”78Both Afghanistan and Iraq lacked the critical “exit strategy” that both Weinberger and Powell had espoused. As Kagan poetically commented, “What happens behind the pointy end of the spear?”79

Militarily, the first phase of the war was a success. With less than half the troops deployed in Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. and a handful of allies stormed into Iraq, sweeping through the south and on to Baghdad with few casualties. Building on the experience of Afghanistan, the invasion force relied on precision weapons and eyes in the sky to pinpoint targets before they were able to strike back.

Vice President Cheney claimed that the war provided “proof positive of the success of our efforts to transform our military,”80but Rumsfeld's plans have a plethora of flaws. Primarily, if the U.S. continues to engage in nation building, it must accept the risks and responsibilities of occupation (Powell's “Pottery Barn” rule).81Afghanistan, despite its attention-getting elections, was not a complete success. Outside of Kabul, it remains a battlefield for clans and warlords fighting with the CIA's money. Washington's insistence on using proxy soldiers of the Northern Alliance and warlords backfired rapidly; instead of building trust with the locals, the U.S. allowed many al Qaeda leaders – most likely including Osama bin Laden – to escape from Tora Bora.82In sum, the administration's obsession with casualty rates and military “transformations” ignored the political realities and necessities of nation building and occupation.

Because debate was often over not “whether” the U.S. should go to war, but “how,” many of the cautionary notions of the Powell Doctrine were marginalized. Furthermore, because the military could not impose sanctions on a state-less enemy, although it did try to cut off its sources of funding and basing, many of the non-military means of the Powell Doctrine also became void. Powell had already won two major diplomatic victories, for both legitimacy and assistance, but much of his doctrine bore little value to the administration.

Afghanistan has shown that an international coalition may not be enough. While an important part of the Powell Doctrine, support is but one of the important factors for winning the war, not just the combat. Powell's belief in using force combined with diplomacy and economics represents the groundwork for a stronger, albeit more costly, path for nation building.83The military is capable of establishing the preconditions for a smooth transfer of power, but only if it is present in sufficient numbers from the outset; the current Pentagon plans make that condition nearly impossible.84

Powell asked many of the same questions back in 1992 that critics of the current war began asking a year ago. Powell's criticism of Vietnam as “half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand”85may not apply yet to Iraq. However, as Mark Danner wrote in the New York Times, “The war's beginning, built on the threat of weapons that did not exist, and its ending, which flickered to life so temptingly on the flight deck of aircraft carrier Lincoln 18 months ago, have disappeared, leaving American troops fighting and dying in a kind of lost, existential desert of the present.”86

Powell's version of history is only one side of the story. Other perspectives offer contrasting viewpoints of the same successes and defeats, presenting drastically different conclusions. Max Boot argued that of all lessons from America 's least successful war, Vietnam, the wrong lesson is to adopt the Powell Doctrine. He argues that although there is no clear exit strategy in Afghanistan or Iraq, the U.S. might fight anyway.87

Michael O'Hanlon has gone so far as to call Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan “a masterpiece of military creativity and finesse.”88Although acknowledging some strategic flaws, namely the failure to capture Osama bin Laden, O'Hanlon presents Afghanistan as a clear demonstration of the benefits of the Pentagon's new thinking. He was right to a degree. The fast, lethal, adept, and sophisticated forces deployed in Afghanistan allowed for a stunningly fast defeat of the Taliban, one of the U.S. 's primary interests. Afghanistan provided a springboard from which Rumsfeld and General Franks created their master plan for the invasion of Iraq. There too the military saw success, measured by the overthrow of Saddam with minimal casualties.

This military transformation, however, is ill suited to undertake the administration's newest endeavors in state building. Acknowledged in both his appointments and speeches, Bush prefers “realism in the service of American ideals.”89However, as former UN Ambassador Holbrooke noted, “The rhetoric reflects a snapshot of the president's mood at a certain moment, but speeches do not matter… unless they are followed up by clear policies.”90As evidenced in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush's rhetoric presents only the public view of this administration.

The ability to defeat anti-democratic regimes decisively, quickly, and with low casualties offers a strong incentive for friendly relations with the United States.91The current strategy, however, leans heavily in favor of state destruction, rather than state formation, undermining both the Powell Doctrine and other views of the war on terror. Similarly, in the stateless hunt for terrorists, Powell's non-military provisions provide only limited applicability.

Non-military means might also be the key to success, although not in the way Powell imagined. In the Cold War, complementing the military campaign against communism were new weapons such as the World Bank, the UN Security Council, the Peace Corps, Radio Free Europe, and the National Endowment for Democracy.92The only new program to emerge since 2001 of similar importance has been the Millennium Fund, helping developing countries move toward democracy, but the fund itself often does little more than to provide mild stipends to countries already receiving aid from the United States. It would be a tremendous help for both Washington's diplomatic and military efforts to engage in new non-military ventures to win over more hearts and minds.

7. Conclusion The evolution of military doctrine from the days of the draft to an all-volunteer army in the post-Cold War environment set the stage for the rise and fall of the Powell Doctrine. The doctrine represented a reflection of both a critique of Vietnam and an embrace of America's influence at the end of the Cold War. Believing in the utility of non-military means, Powell also wanted to make use of all of Washington's resources.

Pragmatism was Powell's ultimate goal. If the politicians gave the military clear objectives and allowed the advisers to do their work, then America's brave soldiers could protect democracy, ensure human freedoms, and preserve American ideals abroad and at home. This was the essence of the Powell Doctrine. Moreover, it was successful in its time. Under his leadership, there was no Bay of Pigs, no repeat of Lebanon, and no Vietnam quagmire.93However, beginning with Somalia in 1992, the military encountered a new role in peacekeeping for which the Powell Doctrine needed adjustment.

Elements of the Powell Doctrine remain central for the future success of the U.S. military. While military intervention may not be suitable as a last resort, it is still important to make use of diplomatic, economic, and other political means to address the conflict. Even against state-less actors such as terrorists, the ability to control finances, limit safe-havens through non-military means, and prevent the proliferation of WMD remain paramount interests. Lastly, military resources and personnel are finite. To prevent the very fears President Bush presented when he took office in 2000, the U.S. must work stronger for stable international alliances and maintain some exit strategy to sustain support at home and maintain a powerful army to combat crises where they might erupt.

While September 11 brought to light some of the incongruity of Powell's doctrine with modern military strategy, many of the differences were associated with the end of the Cold War. It is no coincidence that Panama, in 1989, was the last successful attempt to rebuild a nation with the army. Similarly, the problems that Bush is currently encountering are certainly not new. The trend began nearly a decade before when his father first sent troops to Somalia. Bush's attempts to reign in Clinton's liberal policies were more rhetoric than policy and once again, the President faces the historic challenge of spreading America's influence and liberty abroad at minimum cost to the taxpayers.

1 Colin Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992

2 John Burns, “Shadow of Vietnam falls over Iraq ,” New York Times November 28, 2004

3 Powell, 1992, p. 5

4 Frederick Barnes, Bush Goal: Strategy First, Budget Second, Defense and Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, August 2001

5 Madeleine Albright. Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster? Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003, p. 4

6 http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_sep2002.pdf

7 Enriquez, Arnel. “Powell and the National Security Strategy.” Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 18, Issue 3, October 1, 2004.

8 Michael Howard, “What's in a name?” Foreign Affairs, Fall 2002

9 Enriquez, 2004, p. 6

10 Colin Dueck, “Hegemony on the Cheap: Liberal Internationalism from Wilson to Bush,” World Policy Journal, Winter 2003, p. 5

11 Cited in Dueck, 2003, p. 5

21 Richard Halloran, “ U.S. Will Not Drift Into a Latin War, Weinberger Says” New York Times, November 29, 1984

13 Enriquez, 2004, p. 2

14 Joseph Kraft, “The Use of Force,” Washington Post December 13, 1984

15 Weinberger, Caspar , U.S. Defense Strategy, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1986

16 Cited in James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, New York : the Penguin Group, 2004, p. 44

17 Powell, 1992

18 Branislav Slantchev, “National Security Strategy: New World Order, 2004,” University of California – San Diego, March 7, 2004

19 Mann, 2004, p. 120

20 Enriquez, 2004, p. 3

21 Powell, 1992, p. 4

22 Bruce Jentleson, “Tough Love Multilateralism,” Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003

23 Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building ,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 23, No. 1, Winter 2000

24 Thomas Donnelly, “Lessons Unlearned: A Comparison of Three American Wars,” The National Interest, Summer 2000

25 Mann, 2004, p. 182

26 Powell, 1992, p. 5

27 Ibid., p. 5

28 Mann, 2004, p. 189

29 Powell, 1992, p. 4

30 Ibid., 1992, p. 6

31 Howard Means, Colin Powell , New York : Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1992, p. 278

32 Jon Western, “Roots of Intervention,” International Security, Spring 2002

33 Ibid., p. 4

34 Ibid., p. 7

35 Thomas Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy , Boulder : Westview Press, 2000, p. 97

36 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack , New York : Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 106

37 Robert Cassiday, “Prophets or praetorians? The Uptonian paradox and the Powell Corollary,” Parameters, Vol. 33, Issue 3, October 1, 2003

38 Colin Powell (with Joseph Persico), My American Journey, New York : Ballantine Books, 1995, p. 37

39 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, 2000, p. 1

40 Ibid., p. 4

41 James Kurth, “American Strategy in the global era,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 53 Issue 1, January 1, 2000, p. 7

42 A.J. Bacevich, “ America 's Military in a New Era,” National Interest , Summer 1997, p. 4

43 See also Bacevich, “Different Drummers, Same Drum,” National Interest, Summer 2001

44 Cited in Colin Dueck, “Hegemony on the Cheap,” World Policy Journal, Winter 2003/04

45 Frederick Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” Policy Review, No. 120, August 2003, p.3

46 Ibid., p.3

47 Bacevich, 2001, p. 4

48 Michael McFaul, “The Liberty Doctrine,” Policy Review No. 112, April 2002, p. 4

49 http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09102001_t909foxn.html

50 http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09102001_t0905ms.html

51 http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09102001_t0907ap.html

52 Woodward, 2004, 87

53 James Rubin, “Stumbling into War,” Foreign Affairs, September 2003

54 “U.S. Must Be Ready To use its power, Shultz Declares,” New York Times, December 10, 1984

55 Woodward, 2004, p. 241

56 Cited in Woodward, 2004, p. 34

57 Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs, January 2004, p. 5

58 Madeleine Albright, “Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?” Foreign Affairs, September 2003, p. 4

59 Cited in Woodward, 2004, p. 22

60 Woodward, 2004, p. 223

61 Frederick Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” Policy Review No. 120, August 2003

62 Woodward, “A Struggle for the President's Heart and Mind,” The Washington Post, November 17, 2002

63 Ibid., p. 4

64 Mann, 2004, p. 302

65 Judis, The Folly of Empire, p. 179

66 Woodward, 2004, 155

67 Frontline Interview: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/etc/lessons.html

68 Woodward, 2004, p. 167

69 Ibid., p. 4

70 Ibid., p. 319

71 Bacevich, 2003

72 Woodward, 2004, p. 326

73 Ibid., p. 328

74 Ibid., p. 332

75 Judis, p. 180

76 Ibid., p. 181

77 Cited in Judis, p. 183

78 Kagan, 2003, p. 7

79 Ibid., p. 7

80 Cited in Kagan, 2003, p. 8

81 Kagan, 2003, p. 6; See also William Odom, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs , July 1997, p. 3

82Ibid ., p. 8

83 Enriquez, 2003, p. 4; See also Powell, 1992, p. 5

84 Kagan, 2003, p. 11

85 Powell, 1995, p. 79

86 Mark Danner, “A Doctrine Left Behind,” New York Times , November 21, 2004

87 Michael Barone, “Lessons of History,” US News & World Report , May 20, 2002

88 Michael O'Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece,” Foreign Affairs, May 2002, p. 1

89 Peter Slevin, The Word at the White house, Washington Post , June 23, 2002, 2

90 Cited in Slevin, p. 3

91 McFaul, 2003, p. 11

92 McFaul, “Veering from Reagan,” Policy Review , 2003, p. 4

93 Powell, 1992, p. 5

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