Bush's case for Iraq War does not stand up

Bush's case for Iraq War does not stand up

by EUGENE B. KOGAN
Norwich Bulletin
May 23, 2007

George Tenet's new book, "At the Center of the Storm," has re-ignited the debate about pre-war intelligence on Iraq. One thing is clear: Tenet wants to save his legacy -- not to tell the whole truth about the Bush administration's campaign to lead the uneasy Congress and the American people into this preventive war.

Four years, more than 3,300 U.S. lives and more than $400 billion later, the American people deserve nothing less then the whole truth: The Bush administration's arguments for a preventive action against a growing Iraqi threat were powerful, but largely conjectural, based on the unlikely possibility of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with terrorists and uncertainty about Iraq's nuclear program capability.

As they campaigned to get the public and Congress behind the goal of regime change, President Bush and his senior aides selectively quoted the intelligence available to them, sometimes altogether omitting pieces of intelligence that did not fit into the case for war.

Two factors featured prominently in the Bush administration's case for war: the possibility Iraq could acquire a nuclear weapon, and the danger Iraq could pass weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups. Nuclear threat

On the issue of nuclear weapons, the administration claimed if Saddam Hussein acquired fissile material, then he could develop a nuclear weapon within a year. Then he could threaten and blackmail the civilized world. First, it was uncertain if and/or when Saddam could get the fissile material. Second, if he did, the U.S. intelligence services would very likely have known about it, as they knew in 2002 he was seeking to acquire aluminum tubes. Had they known he had acquired this material, they could have made a persuasive case to the world community for further international action, possibly even a preemptive strike against Iraq's nuclear reactors. Terrorist threat

Iraq's possible cooperation with terrorist organizations as a grounds for war was, like the nuclear rationale, based on what the administration claimed could happen.

Notably, the case for attacking Iraq because of Hussein's possible cooperation with terrorist organizations went directly against available intelligence, indicating war would make such cooperation more likely. George Tenet is not passing up his opportunity to benefit from the whirlwind his book has unleashed and neither should the American people. We must educate ourselves about how the executive branch can manipulate the media and Congress and work on restoring the power to the people through their elected congressional delegations.

Eugene B. Kogan is a senior political analyst at Americans for Informed Democracy in New Haven. A graduate and former trustee at Connecticut College, he is the author of "The War Congress," a report which examines Congress's oversight of foreign policy since 9/11.